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Ambivalence towards discourse of 
disaster resilience
Hanna A. Ruszczyk Assistant Professor (Research), Department of Geography and 
Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience, Durham University, United Kingdom 
This paper investigates empirically how the international aid community (IAC)—donors and 
practitioners—considers and implements disaster resilience in a specific country setting, Nepal, 
and throughout the rest of the world. A key finding is that there is ambivalence about a concept 
that has become a discourse. On a global level, the IAC utilises the discourse of resilience in a 
cautiously positive manner as a bridging concept. On a national level, it is being used to influence 
the Government of Nepal, as well as serving as an operational tool of donors. The mythical 
resilient urban community is fashioned in the IAC’s imaginary; understanding how people create 
communities and what type of linkages with government urban residents desire to develop their 
resilience strategies is missing, though, from the discussion. Disaster resilience can be viewed as 
another grand plan to enhance the lives of people. Yet, regrettably, an explicit focus on individuals 
and their communities is lost in the process. 
Keywords: community, disaster, disaster risk reduction (DRR), policy and practice, 
resilience, urban
Introduction
It [resilience] helped to get better interdisciplinary discussion going. 
—Senior official with a multilateral donor organisation, 2015 
I hate the word resilience! This might be a good place to start. It is framed always in an 
academic context, and I see myself as a practitioner. . . . For me, resilience is the ability to 
survive and have a good life at the end of day. I think we could overly intellectualise it.
—International disaster risk reduction expert, 2016
The two quotations above highlight the ambivalence that the concept of (disaster) 
resilience elicits within the international aid community (IAC). In the first case, a 
senior official working at the interface of disasters, climate change, and conflict in 
many countries states that resilience has allowed different stakeholders to engage in 
conversation, but he/she is reticent to suggest that it has changed his/her organi-
sation. In the second case, an international disaster risk reduction (DRR) expert 
coordinating community-based DRR (CBDRR) activities between international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and the Government of Nepal articu-
lates the frustration of practitioners in utilising the concept of disaster resilience in 
the country. 
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 Matyas and Pelling (2015, p. S5) point out that there is quite limited ‘empirical 
evidence on how resilience understanding is adopted and applied by practitioners, 
managers, community leaders and policymakers in disaster risk management’. 
Anderson (2015, p. 65) adds that ‘[w]e do not know what resilience is and we do not 
know what resilience does’ in practice. This paper attempts to fill this void with 
respect to the IAC (donors and practitioner INGOs). In particular, it seeks to illus-
trate how the IAC in Nepal uses the discourse of disaster resilience and what is lost 
through its employment. 
 The paper argues that on a global level, the IAC is considering the discourse of 
resilience in a cautiously positive manner as a concept that bridges the lacuna between 
different disciplines, such as climate change adaptation, development, and DRR. 
On a national level, disaster resilience is being used to influence the Government of 
Nepal, as well as serving as an operational tool of donors. Furthermore, the paper 
explores to what extent this framing includes residents and communities in urban 
settings in Nepal. Lastly, analysis of this grand plan of resilience leads to an assessment 
of what is lost in this discourse of disaster resilience: an explicit focus on people, 
power, and politics. 
Conceptual framing
Resilience as a discourse
There is no agreed definition of resilience, nor should there be. Owing to its applica-
tion within numerous disciplines, an agreed definition is not possible (Asprone and 
Manfredi, 2014). Resilience is widely seen as a desirable system property in envi-
ronmental management (Klein, Nicholls, and Thomalla, 2003), giving it traction 
beyond the ecological field in complex human-related spheres. Resilience, if viewed 
holistically, can bring together different perspectives (economic, environmental, 
human, physical, and social). 
 What is particularly relevant at this time is how the concept of resilience is being 
used and what this allows to happen in practice. Some academics view resilience as a 
form of neo-liberal governmentality (Evans and Reid, 2013; Joseph, 2013; Chandler, 
2014), whereas others continue to acquire inspiration from it (Brown, 2014, 2016). 
Kelly and Kelly (2016, p. 2) even contend, based on their research on the use of the 
concept by practitioners in the United Kingdom, that it is possible that ‘reclaiming 
resilience, building solidarity, and political agency can also go together’. 
 Resilience has become one of the leading ideas of our time to deal with uncer-
tainty, change, and varied disruptions, as witnessed by policy discourse and academic 
debate on the matter (Hutter et al., 2013; Anderson, 2015). Discourse, as used here, 
follows the definition of Brown (2016, p. 38): ‘A common understanding of a phe-
nomenon shared by a particular group of people. . . . A discourse may become 
institutionalised and may be important in shaping activity or directing policy’. For 
Ambivalence towards discourse of disaster resilience
instance, in Resilience Scan | July–September, Kirbyshire et al. (2017, p. 2) explain that 
‘as the “resilience revolution” in international development continues, researchers at 
ODI [Overseas Development Institute] are capturing the new direction and review-
ing the latest thinking in this field’. Resilience has become a field.
 Resilience has also become the policy ‘buzzword’ of choice for a range of inter-
national decision-makers and it is impacting on traditional conceptions of governance. 
Resilience thinking influences how problems are perceived and addressed and the 
type of knowledge valued by decision-makers (Chandler, 2014). Chandler (2014) 
asserts that resilience is a concept that has become central to government policy 
understanding. In the past two decades, for example, the Hyogo Framework for Action 
2005–2015 (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2005) and 
the more recent Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (United Nations 
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015) have advanced the disaster resilience agenda 
throughout the world. 
 Mitchell and Harris (2012) contend that the concept has been appropriated by bilat-
eral and multilateral donor organisations. Resilience has become an ‘increasingly 
dominant mode of Western intervention in the global South’ (Pugh, 2014, p. 314). 
It is being discussed at the international policy level, position papers have been devel-
oped, and donor projects are being formulated to build disaster resilience, commu-
nity resilience, urban disaster resilience, and other variations of resilience. 
 Apropos of disasters specifically, resilience has become ‘a seductive theory in dis-
aster management’ (Lizarralde et al., 2015, p. S76). While this author does not agree 
that resilience is a theory, seductive it is to bilateral and multilateral donor organisa-
tions. Despite the concept’s lack of rigorous empirical and theoretical grounding in 
the social sciences (Brown, 2012), it has significant purchase in the climate change, 
international development, and DRR fields (Brown, 2012). Moreover, resilience is 
being used to form a bridge between areas of policy and science, but there is limited 
evidence to suggest that the bridge is functioning properly (Brown, 2016). Resilience 
is ‘dangerous because it is removing the inherently power-related connotation of 
vulnerability’, according to Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010, p. 623), who go on 
to claim that the ‘[r]esilience approach is in danger of a realignment towards inter-
ventions that subsumes politics and economics into a neutral realm of ecosystem 
management, and which depoliticizes the causal processes inherent in putting people 
at risk’ (Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010, p. 633). 
 From a positive standpoint, the resilience discourse is bringing together ‘otherwise 
disparate groups, institutions, disciplines and scales’ (Tanner, Bahadur, and Moench, 
2017, p. 3). In Challenges for Resilience Policy and Practice, Tanner, Bahadur, and Moench 
(2017, p. 3) also note that ‘[r]esilience narratives have been accused of a depoliticis-
ing effect by reframing issues in a way that makes populations affected by shocks and 
stresses responsible for securing themselves’. This paper provides conceptual and 
empirical evidence to support this statement.
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Operationalising resilience
Owing to exasperation among donors and practitioners worldwide at the fixation 
on definitions of resilience, practitioner literature has been concentrating on how to 
make resilience ‘useful’ or how to operationalise it, as a metric for project success. 
Operationalising resilience signifies the desire to develop indicators of resilience or 
benchmarks for assessing the concept in different contexts to make it a usable man-
agement tool for governments, policymakers, and practitioners globally. 
 Mochizuki et al. (2017) provide a literature review of community resilience meas-
urement efforts. There are many unknowns with tremendous financial, political, and 
social implications for donors, practitioners, recipient national governments, and, 
most importantly, the people and ‘communities’ that are expected to be more resil-
ient because of the external support received. 
 It is unclear if the operationalisation of resilience through the development of indi-
cators can be or should be promoted further. Bahadur, Ibrahim, and Tanner (2013, 
p. 62) explain that one approach is ‘to develop a set of principles of measuring resil-
ience rather than a universally applicable set of indicators’. Understanding the ele-
ments of resilience that present themselves after a disaster may help to shed light on 
how to build community resilience to natural hazards (Buckle, 2006; Solnit, 2009; 
Ride and Bretherton, 2011; Aldrich, 2012). However, the tensions associated with 
operationalising resilience are difficult to reconcile. Levine (2014, p. 2) suggests that 
the attempt to ‘find the perfect resilience index is not so much a difficult quest as a 
search for a holy grail’, distracting from more important issues such as how to improve 
the lives of millions of people across the planet. 
 Owing to the vast upsurge in the use of the term resilience, and the multitude of 
operational models developed and employed by practitioners, Schipper and Langston 
(2015) conducted a comparative overview of 17 resilience measurement frameworks, 
analysing indicators and approaches used by the IAC globally. They identified dif-
fering epistemic roots and definitions and concluded that there are limits to what 
indicators can provide and that ‘universal indicators cannot exist’ (Schipper and 
Langston, 2015, p. 9). They underscore that ‘the ability to measure resilience through 
consistent mechanisms is intended to enhance the accountability of funding for NGO 
[non-governmental organisation] programmes, which is necessary for budgeting and 
public investment decisions, as well as offering a way of assessing progress towards 
resilience’ (Schipper and Langston, 2015, p. 9) in relation to project variables or the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 or the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations (UN) for 2030. 
 Schipper and Langston (2015) caution against practitioners becoming overwhelmed 
by the challenging and complex frameworks being developed and potentially losing 
the strategic view of their mission. For instance, in some of the frameworks that 
they reviewed, it is not clear whether or not indicators refer to ‘individual or group 
resilience’ or ‘who they are focused on, as in whose resilience is to be built’ (Schipper 
and Langston, 2015, p. 19). They conclude their comparative overview by stating that 
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it would be useful for practitioners and donors to find some common ground (Schipper 
and Langston, 2015, p. 21): 
To ensure that rather than tearing each other down because we don’t agree on how the 
concept is used, we can actually use this energy to help reduce the risk posed by climate 
change and natural hazards.
 This is a damning summary of the state of resilience thinking among donors and 
practitioners and of efforts to operationalise the concept. Béné et al. (2017, p. 212) 
emphasise that existing resilience measurement frameworks are ‘poorly adapted to 
the reality faced by practitioners on the ground’. There is clear frustration with efforts 
to operationalise resilience. While the drive to operationalise resilience may be of 
some value to donors and practitioners, it does not appear to offer much in the way 
of significance to people who live with and manage risk in daily life or when a dis-
aster unfolds. Nightingale (2015, p. 194) notes that in Nepal, there is concern that 
the IAC is ‘devolving responsibility for resilience to locally based populations, and yet 
how they propose to do this, and what support is required to achieve these goals, is 
very different’ to what local people themselves think and express. 
Community, community resilience, and power
A brief interrogation of the concept of community is warranted at this point. In an 
exploration of etymological dictionaries, Esposito (2013, p. 15) states that commu-
nity is derived from cum (with) munus (a task or duty). That is, a group of people who 
are together with a common focus. He argues that we ‘need communities’; they are 
‘both necessary and impossible’ (Esposito, 2013, p. 15). Viewed from this perspective, 
communities are aspirational rather than a tool with which to achieve something 
else. If Esposito (2013, p. 20) is correct—the ‘only way to realize community would 
be to overcome interests and individual differences, but interests and differences are 
in fact insurmountable, because they are also what constitutes our nature’—one needs 
to tread carefully in utilising the concept. 
 In the realm of disaster studies, Cannon et al. (2014) assert that ‘community’ is a 
myth, whereas de Beer (2013) considers it to be a romantic idea of the IAC. Ride 
and Bretherton (2011, p. 3) point out that DRR and disaster researchers ‘tend to 
assume that the community is a pre-existing entity, one that needs to be educated 
otherwise changed to mitigate future hazards, risks and vulnerabilities to natural 
disaster and their effects’. This fallacy continues to be perpetuated. 
 Community resilience and the flow of power through spatial levels requires con-
sideration (Wilson, 2012, p. 1219):
Community resilience, therefore, is often associated with the quest for multiple resiliences 
within a community pursued by highly varying stakeholder networks, some of which may 
be directly contradicting and undermining efforts by other groups in the community to achieve 
maximum resilience.
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 Wilson’s definition of community resilience is associated with multiple scales, influ-
ences, and power. Bankoff et al. (2015, p. 8) argue that, in relation to communities, 
‘power relations are almost always present (in a wide variety of configurations), 
especially on grounds of gender, class, ethnicity, caste, patron–client relations or 
age-group bonding’. These dynamics are often difficult to make visible, but they 
wield tremendous influence on the way in which individuals and their communities 
can present their resilience. 
Methodology and a description of Nepal
Methodology
Through a series of interviews with donors, INGOs, Nepalese practitioners, repre-
sentatives of the Government of Nepal, and residents of two large municipalities of 
Nepal, this paper employs a qualitative comparative approach (McFarlane, Silver, 
and Truelove, 2016) to investigate understandings of resilience. Research methods 
included semi-structured interviews, focus-group discussions, photography, and 
observations of daily life. A total of 125 interviews and six focus-group discussions 
were conducted in Nepali with the support of a research assistant, or in English 
where appropriate. 
 The study adopted a multi-scale perspective, appraising how different scales 
(Swyngedouw, 1997) affect each other and how power and influence flow between 
scales (household, community, local authority, national, and international). The 
research was carried out in an iterative manner over a three-year period (November 
2013–October 2016) and coincided with the phases referred to by the IAC: ‘before, 
during and after’ the high-intensity earthquake of April–May 2015 that claimed 
the lives of almost 9,000 people (United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2015). A one-month research trip took place in November 
2017 to learn about governance changes on a national and local level. 
 To comprehend how urban disaster community resilience projects were being 
structured, 20 semi-structured interviews were organised with members of the IAC 
located in the city of Bharatpur in south-central Nepal, as well as in the capital, 
Kathmandu, and internationally. Semi-structured interviews were also held with 60 
residents in the cities of Bharatpur and Dhangadhi in the far west of the country (with 
populations of approximately 300,000 and 150,000, respectively). These people were 
selected with local support to ensure a cross-section of society. In addition, 45 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with local-, district-, and national-level gov-
ernment officials, as well as with key municipal stakeholders, including business 
association members, community leaders, construction sector employees, health 
volunteers, nurses, and teachers. Information garnered from these interviews set the 
context for understanding urbanisation, risk perceptions, resilience strategies, gov-
ernance structures, and changing urban relationships. The data were coded into 
emerging themes and analysed. 
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A description of Nepal
Nepal has made significant development gains in some respects. In fact, the country 
is regarded as a success story in terms of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
of the UN. According to the Millennium Development Goals Needs Assessment for Nepal 
2010 (Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission, and the United Nations 
Development Programme, 2011), despite the decade-long conflict (in which approx-
imately 13,000 people died) and political instability, progress has been significant 
in a number of areas. This has continued with the SDGs (Government of Nepal, 
National Planning Commission, 2017).
 The MDGs, such as education and mortality, highlight the significant advances 
that the Government of Nepal has made on behalf of its population (Government of 
Nepal, National Planning Commission, 2017). Poverty has decreased very rapidly in 
the country in recent decades (Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2012, section 5, p. 9): 41.8 per cent of the population was living below the poverty line 
in 1995–96, whereas the proportion was 25 per cent in 2011—the rate was even lower 
in urban areas: 15.46 per cent (Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2012, section 4.1, p. 4). By 2015, the rate had fallen to 21.6 per cent (Government of 
Nepal, National Planning Commission, 2017). 
 Unfortunately, Nepal ‘remains one of the world’s 48 “least” developed countries 
even after more than sixty years of “development”’ (Rigg et al., 2016, p. 64). With 
regard to the economy, ‘almost half of all households in Nepal have either a current or 
returnee migrant’ (World Bank, 2011, p. 26), illustrating how difficult it is to earn 
a livelihood in the country. Its economy is extremely dependent on international 
mobility and the income of its young men (World Bank, 2016). Remittances com-
prised 14 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000; 22 per cent of GDP in 
2010; and 32 per cent of GDP in 2015. The national economic situation is sufficiently 
precarious to force an estimated five million Nepalis to leave their families and earn 
livelihoods abroad (United Nations Development Programme, 2017). 
 Three key events occurred during the period of this study: 
• first, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck on 25 April 2015, followed by a series of 
aftershocks, most notably a 7.3 magnitude tremblor on 12 May 2015; 
• second, the National Constituent Assembly promulgated a new constitution in 
September 2015 after deliberating for seven years; and 
• third, the number of municipalities in Nepal increased by 275 per cent, creating a 
nominally more urban country. 
 The political changes led to local elections in 2017 (the first in 20 years) and the 
establishment of a new form of federalism, which is leading to significant restructur-
ing of the public sector. In spring 2017, the new federal government accorded the 
locally elected authorities significant responsibility, but the financial and human 
resources needed to implement their new mandate are in a state of flux.
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What does the discourse of resilience allow?
Globally, resilience discourse bridges a gap
Climate change, conflict, development, and DRR were addressed in a siloed manner 
until recently. The discourse of resilience bridges silos of thinking and creates a 
conceptual opening and a common meeting ground for different debates. Such 
conceptual space can facilitate exploration of how to ‘work across silos’ (Levine et 
al., 2012, p. 1) and how to develop interrelationships (Schipper and Pelling, 2006; 
Bahadur, Ibrahim, and Tanner, 2010; Béné, Newsham, and Davies, 2013; Matyas 
and Pelling, 2015). It is a unifying concept (Mitchell and Harris, 2012) that mini-
mises dichotomous thinking and spotlights linkages between the natural and social 
spheres (Rival, 2009). The necessity of this space for conversation and dialogue 
should not be underestimated. 
 The senior official responsible for climate change, disasters, and conflict on a global 
scale whose quote opens this paper explained that the concept of resilience ‘helped 
to get better interdisciplinary discussion going. There are now more diverse actors 
talking together in the same room’ (including climate change, development, DRR, 
and humanitarian specialists). He/she went on to note:
Resilience is definitely a buzzword in my opinion. . . . It is a good thing, the idea behind 
it. It took root. A lot of organisations are working to embed it in the work they do, and 
trying to work differently. So it [resilience] will stay. Maybe not in the way it was talked 
about . . . years ago [operationalising it], but as an approach in terms of the way we need 
to change the way we work.
 Resilience is being viewed in a cautiously positive manner, as a new way of think-
ing among the IAC, allowing for a space to be created where new forms of col-
laboration within the IAC can be initiated and implemented. In the same meeting, 
a colleague of the senior official from a multilateral donor organisation added: 
In my view, it [resilience] is nothing new. . . . There is a need for the [international aid] 
community to come up every now and then with a new term [around which] to gather 
together. There will be something else that will be pushed up in a few years, but it does not 
mean that resilience will not stay. 
 These two international representatives suggest that resilience is a mechanism 
through which donors and INGOs within the IAC can frame their work in a differ-
ent manner. Resilience as a concept is useful to them, as it is allows donors and prac-
titioners to consider their portfolio of work in a different way, but not to lose sight of 
the respective organisation’s mandate. ‘Resilience reflects and seeks to offer a positive 
alternative to the loss of modern frameworks’ (Pugh, 2014, p. 314). Resilience as a 
bridging mechanism is positive and valued by these interviewees.
 There will be disillusionment within the IAC if resilience is ‘pushed to represent 
more than it can deliver’; ‘the problem lies in attempts to make resilience a full-scale 
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paradigm, which it is not’ (Alexander, 2013, p. 2713). Conversely, on a global level, 
Joseph (2013, p. 50) argues that resilience may be now:
Overused to the point of banality so that what was once referred to as putting down sand 
bags to stop flooding or ensuring that there are separate toilets for men and women are 
now described as resilience measures. The difficulty, therefore, is picking out usages of the 
term that have some genuine meaning . . . the key connection is governance. And again, 
this governance is working from a distance.
Resilience discourse influences the Government of Nepal
The IAC, comprising donors and INGOs, influences national and local government-
level priorities as well as emerging discussions concerning climate change adaptation, 
development, and DRR. Donor interventions and the actions of state government 
‘interact with transnational imaginaries, contributing to the flow of meanings and 
shaping institutional spaces and practices’ (Berry and Gururani, 2015, p. 6). This 
form of governmentality is evident in Nepal, and is applicable to other development 
assistance recipient countries as well.
 The IAC is powerful and its views hold sway over the Government of Nepal. 
Not only did it introduce DRR and disaster resilience discourse in Nepal, but also 
it defined debate on these matters. It wields considerable power in Nepal, owing, to 
a large extent, to its significant financial contribution to the country ( Jones, Oven, 
and Wisner, 2016). As Jones, Oven, and Wisner (2016, p. 34) stress: ‘It is clear that 
the influence of international organisations in Nepal is very significant and that the 
donor community plays a large role in advancing the DRR agenda, especially earth-
quake risk reduction’. In Nepal, the IAC has supported the development of disaster 
management plans on a national, district, and municipal or village development 
committee (VDC) level. In addition, it has been working on CBDRR initiatives 
to develop disaster-resilient communities under the framework of Flagship 4 of the 
Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)—the latter was disbanded in 2016 and 
Flagship 4 continued in a modified form in 2017. 
 Governments in donor countries are influencing national decisions in recipient 
nations such as Nepal, including which hazards and risks are most important and 
how to mitigate disasters. Joseph (2013) does not think people and the communities 
they create play much of a role in the resilience discourse described above. They are 
not the priority in relation to governing for resilience. Instead, he views resilience 
as a device ‘in an artificial construction where the real targets are states and govern-
ments’ that need to be managed by the IAC ( Joseph, 2013, p. 51) in order to imple-
ment sectoral international priorities such as DRR. 
 This author agrees with him: the IAC is using resilience to steer national govern-
ments’ limited human and technical resources towards DRR, in particular, rather 
than to produce a holistic understanding of risk. By so doing, some national and local 
factors that may enhance (disaster) resilience are ignored, such as strengthening link-
ages between government and people (Ruszczyk, 2017), strengthening livelihoods 
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(Ruszczyk, 2014), and addressing a fuller continuum of risk (Ziervogel et al., 2017; 
Ruszczyk, 2018).
 The recent past shows that ‘resilience thinking’ provides a mechanism for dialogue 
as well as possible collaboration and holistic thinking within the IAC. Where this 
begins to fray or fall apart is outside of the IAC. Matyas and Pelling (2015, p. S2) state 
that resilience is a new term but that there may be ‘no new action on the ground’. 
Pelling (2011, p. 51) also proposes caution in utilising the concept of resilience:
The power of resilience to suppress deeper changes in the institutions and values that shape 
development and risk management is reinforced by its attractiveness as a solution . . . for 
donors and government precisely because it does not challenge the wider status quo. 
 The discourse of resilience and resilience thinking is of limited use to national 
actors in Nepal. The discomfort and even hostility directed towards resilience as a 
framing mechanism can be seen in the perspective of a Nepalese disaster-oriented 
NGO. A senior official with this organisation said the following about the drivers 
of resilience and DRR in Nepal:
Who is leading DRR in this country? Who is the main driver of DRR in this country? 
Basically it is the foreigners! The government is basically guided by foreigners. For me, 
right from the very beginning, without the involvement of the local people and local culture 
and local authorities, I do not accept [the premise of] any of the DRR programmes. They 
are bound to fail!
 Jones, Oven, and Wisner (2016) found similar views about DRR and resilience 
in their comparison of the governance landscape of earthquake risk reduction in Nepal 
and the state of Bihar in east India. 
 ‘Disaster community resilience’ is an operational tool
The concept of resilience is allowing conversations to take place on a global level, and 
it may be deconstructing siloes. While this is of significant international merit, on 
a national level, where donor projects are implemented, resilience may not have 
significant conceptual value. Rather, it is being used as an operational device to 
manage projects. Resilience is a discourse that has been instrumentalised to suit the 
needs of donors that have to account for their efforts in a more systematic manner. 
 In Nepal, disaster community resilience is an operational tool of donors vis-à-vis 
the INGOs working in the country. Donors and INGOs that, together with the 
Government of Nepal, were involved as part of Flagship 4 of the NRRC (Nepal 
Risk Reduction Consortium, 2013), developed nine minimum characteristics of a 
disaster-resilient community, in an attempt to operationalise resilience. These nine 
minimum characteristics were incorporated, from 2012, in the disaster risk manage-
ment projects and programmes of practitioners funded under Flagship 4—the latter’s 
budget was USD 44.3 million between 2011 and 2016 (Oven et al., 2017). 
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 The nine minimum characteristics of a disaster-resilient community are:
• organisational base at the VDC/ward and community level;
• access to DRR information;
• multi-hazard risk and capacity assessments;
• community preparedness/response teams;
• DRR/management plan at VDC/municipality level;
• DRR funds;
• access to community-managed DRR resources;
• local-level risk/vulnerability reduction measures; and
• community-based early warning systems.
 An IAC respondent working on the nine minimum characteristics (at the inter-
face between donors, practitioners, and the Government of Nepal) underlined that 
the initiative:
Has been encouraged, heavily encouraged, by donors along with impact analysis and assess-
ment because there is pressure from donors who are getting pressure from their governments, 
who are getting pressure from constituents, about where all this money goes. 
 In response to the question ‘why is resilience being used in this manner?’, the same 
person said:
But what else are they [donors and INGOs] going to use? Resilience is the term now that 
everyone understands and is so generalised that you can apply it to any field. . . . What 
other term is there for health, education, disaster, climate change? 
 The reality is that ‘resilience’ does not have a common definition and decision-
makers who apply the concept in Nepal (the IAC and the national government) do 
not have a common understanding of its meaning. The minimum characteristics of 
a disaster-resilient community may not be particularly relevant to people and commu-
nities according to the IAC respondent cited above. The nine baseline components 
do not address fully the range of risks and hazards as perceived by people. According 
to this particular IAC respondent, the minimum characteristics are responsible for: 
Creating a collective and creating a mass movement of INGOs, people with money 
[donors] and of the government [of Nepal]. It is both. The nine characteristics are a mar-
keting tool. That is what they are. They are a marketing tool to get the attention of and 
to try to make the concept of disaster management more understandable [to the government].
 He/she added: 
I do not think they [the minimum characteristics] are resilience . . . they are just a way to 
package it, but not a definition of resilience.
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 The situation in Nepal reflects the state of affairs around the world. The framing 
of resilience has altered from ‘building back better’ (Monday, 2002, p. 1), to ‘bounc-
ing back’ (Twigg, 2007), to ‘bouncing forward’ (Manyena, 2009) to a better future. 
In a seminal article, Manyena (2006, p. 436) contended that disaster resilience could 
become a new phrase, the primary value of which would be its description of ‘a 
desired outcome of a disaster risk reduction programme’. Levine (2014) claims that 
the desire to operationalise or quantify resilience is an attempt by donors and practi-
tioners to account for funds granted. This appears to have become a reality in Nepal 
and internationally. 
Problematising resilient communities
The mythical resilient (urban) community
The Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD) states that respon-
sibility in the event of a disaster will lie primarily at the community (neighbour-
hood) level. A senior government official in the ministry, which ceased to exist in 
2018, replaced principally by the newly created Ministry of Local Development and 
General Administration (MoLDGA), proposed the following definition of a disaster-
resilient community: 
The community is central. Government and other partners can improve their capacity 
to deal with a disaster. Government is a small part in the capacity of the community. 
Communities that have sufficient capacity to save their lives and property from disaster, 
we think if these communities have these capacity, these communities are resilient.
 This is a particularly narrow interpretation of a disaster-resilient community, with 
minimal thought paid to complexity, inter-linkages, scales, and the role of govern-
ment and other partners. The focus is on recouping losses; there is little consideration 
of the future. 
 The IAC worked with MoFALD for several years to support CBDRR initiatives. 
Many of the projects are striving to develop disaster-resilient communities under 
Flagship 4 of the NRRC. The senior government official cited above stressed that 
the community is at the heart of disaster resilience at the local level. The urban com-
munity needs to take care of itself; the government does not have a large role to play 
in helping communities become resilient. It is unclear how he/she expects commu-
nities to help themselves and using whose resources. The national government is 
abdicating responsibility to its people.
 A decades-long myth continues to be perpetuated that communities are ‘capable 
of anything . . . all that is required is sufficient mobilisation (through institutions) 
and the latent capacities of the community will be unleashed . . . the evidence does 
little to support such claims’ (Cleaver, 2001, p. 46). The MoFALD representative 
argued that government should fulfil a support function; it only needs to play a small 
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role. The lowest level of formal government in Nepal is the ward; there is no formal 
public sector mechanism to support the neighbourhood level. Consequently, the 
government has the flexibility to decide whom to support in a time of crisis or disaster 
and whom to ignore owing to informality of government procedures (Ruszczyk, 2017). 
 The senior official problematised communities in an urban municipality: ‘In one 
ward there will be four or five communities, [it is] difficult to merge these four [to] 
five communities into one, and each community has its separate problems’. He/she 
pointed out that urban communities, smaller than the ward geographically, are 
expected to be self-reliant with minimal support from government because the latter 
does not have the resources and the capacity. 
 The official, based in Kathmandu, clearly understands the tension between how 
the national government, with the financial and technical backing of the IAC, is 
structuring disaster resilience and the role of the public sector in managing resilience-
building efforts. For instance, MoFALD, and its successor, MoLDGA, require that 
municipalities have disaster management plans, including at the ward level. The 
central government explains that local authorities will have a budgetary provision for 
disaster resilience. Local governments have newly elected ward presidents but there 
is no formal mechanism to establish a connection with the government’s interpre-
tation of a community—that is, the neighbourhood group. 
People and their communities are missing 
The phrase ‘disaster community resilience’ is useful for the IAC. Through the dis-
course of resilience, donors and INGOs can work under an operational framework 
that structures their work in a new programmatic manner. The need to work in a 
different way has been an issue for decades, but the resilience discourse is creating a 
testing ground for new means of implementation. Regrettably, however, an explicit 
focus on people is absent from this discourse. Unacknowledged are the ‘beneficiaries’ 
of these IAC projects; the communities of people who are expected to be resilient—
in relation to what and over what time period is unclear. 
 There is not much of an overlap between communities targeted by projects and 
organically created forms of community or networks that exist already. There is a 
disconnect between the manner in which the IAC is working in Nepal and how 
urban communities organise and attempt to address their perceived continuum of 
hazards and risks. An IAC respondent who has worked for many years on the nine 
minimum characteristics in Nepal asserted that donors and INGOs view ‘commu-
nity as just this other thing at the end, which they then try to shove into a box for 
measurement purposes’. 
 Communities formed organically by residents fall away as an object of analysis in 
this disaster-resilience discourse of the IAC. In this operational framework of quan-
tification, log frames and accountability with regard to funding, individuals, and com-
munities are missing. The rush to redistribute responsibility for disaster resilience from 
government to communities is increasingly problematic if the role of government 
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is lost in the discussion and the burden for being resilient is on the individual or on 
urban ‘communities’. 
 There are indications, based on the author’s interviews in late 2017 with recently 
elected local government officials, that local authorities intend to work with all 
(informal) neighbourhood groups. Challenges, though, include the fact that in many 
cities, there are no neighbourhood groups or residents are excluded from neighbour-
hood groups owing to caste/ethnicity, socioeconomic class, or landownership status. 
These urban residents will struggle to be resilient without the support of these key 
social structures in the cities. 
 If the focus is on community in the form of neighbourhood groups, the more 
vulnerable members of society are left unseen, unheard, and unable to become 
resilient to unforeseen disasters. In the past, the development ‘gaze turned peasants, 
women, and the environment into spectacles’ (Escobar, 2012, p. 155). One could 
argue now that the international DRR and development discourse is establishing 
so-called resilient communities as the spectacle without genuinely engaging with 
people and communities. Understanding how people create communities and what 
type of linkages to government they desire in building their resilience strategies 
(Katz, 2004) is missing from discussions nationally and internationally.
 By employing the phrase disaster-resilient community vis-à-vis CBDRR projects, 
the IAC in Nepal is generating an illusion of supporting the resilience of people to 
natural hazards in Nepal. This criticism (of not engaging fully with people) is not 
peculiar to resilience; it is in fact a feature of many development interventions in 
the country and abroad. Nevertheless, it still warrants interrogation in this analysis 
of disaster resilience. 
Analysis of a grand plan
Disaster resilience and the complexity of the everyday
Disaster resilience can be considered as another grand plan (Scott, 1998) introduced 
by the international community to enhance the lives of people in the Global South. 
The concept of disaster community resilience allows outsiders, such as the IAC in 
Nepal, interested in influencing the structures and behaviour of governments and 
groups working on DRR to stake a claim concerning the impacts. Yet, disaster com-
munity resilience does not engage sufficiently with urban residents, their continuum 
of urban disaster risk, their sources of and access to power, and the politics involved. 
 As Joseph (2013, p. 52) underscores: ‘The limits to resilience are real. Although 
it might increasingly pervade international organisations, this does not necessarily 
have any meaningful effects on the ground’. Resilience has been introduced with 
well-wished desires (positive change for people) that prove difficult to achieve in 
practice. How the concept is being used within the disaster resilience discourse, 
and the approach supported by donors in Nepal, are at odds with the needs of people 
in cities. 
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 There is increasing concern among the IAC about the application of the concept 
of resilience. Resilience has been encapsulated in a wider debate critiquing develop-
ment. In addition, there is awareness that in Nepal, as in other places, ‘development’ 
has helped to manufacture risk (Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010). The relationship 
between development and disasters necessitates consideration at this point. Disasters 
should be understood as unsolved development problems since they are not events of 
nature, but, rather, the product of the interaction of people, society, and the natural 
environment (Cardona, 2004). 
 In a paper entitled ‘Engendering development and disasters’, Bradshaw (2014) calls 
for an explicit focus on the root causes of women’s vulnerability, and suggests that 
IAC programmes be designed to concentrate on reducing gender inequalities by 
challenging unequal power relations. With regard to this paper, it is contended that 
donor projects should focus explicitly not just on gender, but also on people, urban 
residents, the root causes of vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004), and the continuum of 
perceived risk that individuals face in the everyday, including to their livelihoods 
and economic security (Ruszczyk, 2014, 2017, and 2018). An international DRR 
expert in Nepal made the following observation:
What I really think and from what I have seen, in order to talk about resilience, you 
have to talk about the bigger context of how to improve livelihoods. . . . So you cannot 
talk about [disaster] resilience if people have nothing. And they have no capacity to think 
about tomorrow. 
 This respondent argues for a more holistic understanding of development, differ-
entiating between disaster resilience to a hazard and resilience as a more general 
concept, whereby people have opportunities for a better life on their own terms. 
Increasingly, members of the IAC are dissatisfied with the narrow application of 
resilience to a hazard. Instead, they are seeking a more holistic understanding of the 
risks and hazards that confront residents. The IAC is critiquing ‘development’ in 
Nepal. The DRR expert cited above suggests that international policymakers and 
Nepalese people comprehend issues in very different ways. 
 In an interview after the earthquake in 2015, another international expert working 
on CBDRR highlighted interrelated issues (exclusion based on caste and the rela-
tionship between the economy and governance) that CBDRR resilience projects have 
ignored until now. He/she stated that, within Nepalese society: 
Exclusion is based on caste basically. There is a lot of corruption. The [national] budgets 
are not used properly. The budgets are used to reinforce the system. Basically, when we talk 
about resilience, when we talk about systems, in Nepal the system is actually so broken 
down, the communities are on their own for most of it. So [all of us] need to address [the] 
governance issue. This would be the starting point. Also poverty and [the] economy. The 
livelihoods of the people do not give them enough space to get out of the poverty trap. 
[The focus of the IAC] should be less about disasters and more about other things in my 
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opinion. More about [the] economy and governance. Disasters are important, but the indi-
viduals are working all year to get out of [the] poverty trap, the disaster reduces a bit of 
effectiveness or efficiency of what they have achieved.
 He/she explained that historically, the government has been seen as an exploita-
tive structure against large portions of the Nepalese people, adding: ‘I think they 
[the Nepalese people] are [being] pushed to the limit’. Nepalese people cannot do 
more for themselves. In reality, they are already resilient subjects (O’Malley, 2010; 
Evans and Reid, 2013). They need other governance scales to support them, such 
as the newly elected local authorities and the new federal government (as of 2017), 
in order to have a better quality of life and a safe future. 
What is lost by using the discourse of resilience? 
People, power, and politics are lost in this grand plan of (disaster) resilience. An 
understanding of the priorities of people and how they already cope and show their 
resilience is absent. People’s expressed desire for safety is lost in the discourse of resil-
ience. Bahadur and Tanner (2014) underscore the need to consider people, power, 
and politics in their exploration of how the concept is employed within the Asian 
Cities Climate Change Resilience Network initiative in India. 
 Donors and practitioners bring their own priorities (DRR and an emphasis on 
particular hazards), language, and tools (such as CBDRR and disaster resilience) to 
Nepal and other countries that receive funding. Resilience discussions in the realm 
of climate change and disasters are based, to a significant extent, on Western con-
cepts and thus are not particularly relevant in the Global South (Voss and Funk, 
2015). The language of resilience allows international and national policymakers to 
hide behind people who are accorded responsibility for helping themselves in times 
of hardship. These are people who are largely ‘pushed to the limit’ in the words of 
the international CBDRR expert quoted earlier. Focusing on disaster resilience is 
insufficient in this context. 
 Why and how resilience is of value or a necessity, as well as by whom and for 
whom, are matters that are also not often addressed. Carpenter et al. (2001) were 
the first to ask ‘resilience of what to what?’, a question that remains pertinent. 
Drawing on the understandings of development and science and technology stud-
ies, Leach (2008, p. 3) suggests querying: ‘resilience of what, for whom?’. If urban 
residents, communities, and cities (Vale, 2014) are to enhance their resilience (or 
be more than resilient) to an event, a natural hazard (Tobin, 1999; Gaillard, 2007; 
Fernando, 2012) or specifically a seismic hazard (Bruneau et al., 2003; Ainuddin 
and Routray, 2012), then power issues need to be considered. Slater (2014, n.p.) even 
hypothesises that ‘“resilience” studiously, perhaps even judiciously, ignores every 
important question’ in relation to uneven development, enabling, inter alia, political 
structures and state strategies. 
 Only by asking questions such as ‘whose resilience is important?’ to ‘what event 
or hazard?’, ‘whose lens is being used to examine resilience?’, ‘who impacts on 
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resilience?’, and listening to and comprehending the power relations, the range of 
scales involved, and the complex intersectionality between those scales, can resilience 
as a concept be used to benefit those who need to be more than resilient subjects. 
It is here that further exploration of people’s perceptions of risk, economic security, 
social networks and communities, and relationship to government is warranted, not 
only in Nepal but also in many other countries. 
Conclusion
This paper investigates empirically how the IAC (donors and practitioner INGOs) 
considers and implements (disaster) resilience internationally and nationally in Nepal. 
The country setting of Nepal is specific (a post-conflict and hazard-prone nation), 
but the general themes of this analysis can be generalised to other parts of the world 
where the IAC has introduced the (disaster) resilience discourse. 
 The two quotations at the beginning of the introduction suggest that the discourse 
of resilience can be viewed positively and negatively within the IAC. On a global 
level, the IAC is considering the discourse of resilience in a cautiously positive man-
ner as a bridging mechanism via which donors and INGOs can attempt to work 
together more effectively across the areas of climate change adaptation, conflict, devel-
opment, and DRR. On a national level, disaster resilience is being used to influence 
the Government of Nepal, as well as serving as an operational tool of donors. Disaster 
community resilience is a project management instrument of donors to measure the 
effectiveness of CBDRR projects in Nepal. 
 Regrettably, however, an explicit focus on people and their communities is lost 
in the process. The mythical resilient urban community is fashioned in the IAC’s 
imaginary; understanding how people create communities and what type of linkages 
with government urban residents desire to develop their resilience strategies is miss-
ing, though, from this discussion. The bottleneck in supporting urban residents to 
be more resilient is to be found within both the IAC and the national government.
 Disaster resilience can be viewed as another grand plan introduced by the inter-
national community to enhance the lives of people. The concept allows the IAC in 
Nepal to influence the structures and behaviour of government and practitioners 
working on DRR in order to stake a claim to the impacts. However, disaster com-
munity resilience does not engage sufficiently with urban residents, their understand-
ing of urban risks and hazards, their sources of resilience, and the ways in which 
people interact with the government to build a safe future. 
 If the IAC community could listen to residents’ perceptions of risk and understand 
the social networks already in place, its interventions would be structured in a differ-
ent manner. This would entail more of a spotlight on livelihoods, urban infrastruc-
ture, and the relationship between government and people, and would be a starting 
point in shaping a safer future. Governance would play a key role here; linkages 
between people and government would be enhanced so that they can work together 
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in the short and long term on everyday and infrequent risks, including hazards such 
as earthquakes and floods. 
 These types of projects may be difficult to account for in a log frame or within 
other project management tools. The benefits of such projects would also not be 
immediate, making it difficult for INGOs to demonstrate the impacts of their pro-
jects to donors. A focus on people, power, and politics has been lost through the 
discourse of resilience and urban residents are left behind to take care of themselves 
and to create a safe future. People deserve more—the effort needs to be made.
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